There is often a basic tension at the boundary between science and policy e the former seeks unbiased, objective descriptions of reality, while the latter must incorporate various factors in its development, including values, ideologies, economics, biases, and emotions. Problems may arise if, and when, marine scientists who enter the policy arena fail to understand these differing priorities, and we describe some common pitfalls. Various strategies are presented for marine conservation scientists to consider in order to avoid or minimize misunderstandings, especially with the media. Conflict of interest issues and public perception of bias are also addressed, as is misuse of research results and whether scientists have an obligation to correct misrepresentation of their research. Finally, we consider how marine scientists should address the inherent uncertainty in their results when those results are used to develop policy, including the importance of incorporating the Precautionary Principle when making science-based policy.
Introduction
Conservation scientists have long debated whether they should advocate for their science (Lackey, 2007; Noss, 2007; Chan, 2008; Nelson and Vucetich, 2009; Parsons, 2013) , but in recent years attitudes have changed. The need for marine conservation scientists and their professional societies to become more engaged with managers and policy-makers is now generally recognized. However, policy is politics and politics is people. This means that when governments determine conservation policy, values, ideologies, economics, biases, and emotions are all factors to consider in the decision-making, with varying degrees of relevance depending on the issue. Politics and policy-makers often (usually) have a different agenda from that of science, which seeks unbiased, objective descriptions of reality. Any marine scientist who chooses to get involved in policy needs to understand this fundamental difference from the outset or problems will ensue. While we encourage more marine scientists to become involved in advocating for sciencebased policy decisions (see Parsons, 2013) , here we offer a summary of the pitfalls that the unprepared may encounter when entering the policy arena.
Marine scientists engaging in policy
"Back off, man, I'm a scientist." Bill Murray as Dr. Peter Venkman in the film Ghostbusters Scientists often believe that in order to make good natural resources policy, all that is needed is good science. For example, in 1998 a researcher posted on the marine mammal science listserve MARMAM that " [a] fter 20 years of work with and around marine mammals I have come to the conclusion that there is only one thing that will save them: research."
While science is a very important factor in policy-making related to natural resources, in fact it is rarely the most important e and is never the only e input that matters. Science can sometimes take a protracted time to produce meaningful results and if only bad policy is made in the meantime, a great deal of damage could result.
Marine scientists who believe that good policy exclusively hinges on science can develop an elevated or unrealistic sense of their own importance e we would go so far as to call it arrogance e which can hinder effective communication in the policy arena. Policy-makers, no more than anyone else, do not like being patronized. Academic arrogance, or even the perception of arrogance, can lead to chronic communications breakdowns.
Moreover, scientists often do not understand that many people, including policy-makers, will ignore scientific evidence if it contradicts their core beliefs and values (Redlawsk, 2002; Lewandowsky et al., 2013; Nyhan et al., 2014) .
2.1. Policy-makers and science illiteracy "They say a little knowledge is a dangerous thing, but it's not one half so bad as a lot of ignorance" Pratchett (1987, by Terry Pratchett)
A major current example is the continuing public debate in the United States as to whether climate change even exists (Smith and Leiserowitz, 2012; Schneider, 2009) , despite strong scientific evidence that it does and moreover is being caused by human activity (IPCC, 2007; Lovejoy, 2014) . Denying scientific facts is not unique to climate change, however (Diethelm and McKee, 2009 ). There are more egregious examples, such as politicians who do not believe in evolution, ignoring the plethora of data to the contrary.
For example, Representative Paul Broun (R-GA), of the U.S. Congress' House Committee on Science, Space and Technology, once stated that "all that stuff I was taught about evolution and embryology and Big Bang theory, all that is lies straight from the pit of hell" (Associated Press, 2012) . Rep. Broun holds a medical degree and thus is one of the few members of Congress who has a science background, yet he believes that the earth is only 9000 years old (Associated Press, 2012) . The former chair of the House Committee, (former) Representative Bart Gordon (D-TN), explained that "[the current committee members] see science as a liberal plot, to validate something they don't think is true. And climate change is a good example" (Anonymous, 2013 ; also see https:// whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2014/12/04/im-no-scientistcolbert-on-republican-climate-change-denialism/).
Disregard of science in the United States is especially galling, as the US Constitution states that Congress has a duty "to promote the Progress of Science" (Article 1, Section 8). This statement actually comes before Congressional power to declare war and to form a navy. The current state of affairs would certainly horrify the scientists among the founders of the nation, such as Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin (who was a Fellow of the Royal Society). This is not a uniquely current occurrence, as Isaac Asimov, Boston University biochemistry professor, author, and science advocate (1980), pointed out more than three decades ago:
"There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that my ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."
However, no matter how many scientific facts are presented to such policy-makers, their deeply held beliefs may cause them to reject those that do not fit within their world view. The likelihood of scientists' changing these firmly held beliefs and values is negligibly small. The incoming chair of the US Congressional Environment and Public Works Committee is an infamous climate change denier, who even published a book called "The Greatest Hoax: How the Global Warming Conspiracy Threatens Your Future" (Inhofe, 2012) . To write an entire book on how anthropogenic climate change is not happening requires an author to ignore the vast majority of peer-reviewed science on the issue and disregard the opinion of scientists on a truly enormous scale. Therefore, it may sometimes be necessary to reframe an argument and to present issues to such policy-makers in ways that avoid mention of trigger topics such as climate change or evolution and in terms that they understand and value, if the goal is to get their acceptance of certain related information. For example, scientists could frame the protection of whales not by extolling the importance of protecting biodiversity or saving a majestic species, but by emphasizing their contribution to tourism revenue generation and the associated benefits to coastal economies (Parsons et al., 2003) .
Communicating with policy-makers
A number of papers have been written on the skills and training required by conservation biologists (Blockstein, 2002; Jacobson, 1990; Jacobson and Robinson, 1990; Cannon et al., 1996; Jacobson and McDuff, 1998; Inouye and Dietz, 2000; Clark, 2001; Fisher et al., 2009; Muir and Schwartz, 2009; Blickley et al., 2013; Parsons, 2012) and they frequently point out the need to be able to understand policy and communicate with policy-makers. However, scientists are often overconfident in their communication skills, equating good teaching evaluations and conference presentations with wider communication skills. Scientists can completely lose an audience of Congressional aides by explaining in excruciating detail the theory and methodology of their studies, instead of providing a brief summary of research conclusions and public, economic and political implications of their work, about which policy-makers care most (Parsons, 2013) . Communications training is important preparation for engaging in the policy arena
Troublesome scientists
Here are three 'types' of scientists who can create difficulties (rather than assist in solutions) when involving themselves in policy debates and discussions.
The Naïve Scientist
These scientists believe that if only policy-makers had the right information, they would make the right decisions. They do not understand the important human and legal dimensions of policy-making and make little attempt to interpret their work in that context. As one researcher stated in an interview, "If all sides devoted their resources to research rather than to lawsuits, we could get some answers, but without them, the lawsuits will continue" (Madin, 2009 ).
The 'Ivory Tower' Scientist
They believe that it is essential for scientists to remain 'pure', to stay at arm's length from anything resembling advocacy, even though they may also seek media attention for their work. This may result in essential data not reaching policy-makers, resulting in poor decisions. Or, even worse, their research is mischaracterized or misunderstood and they make no attempt to correct these misinterpretations (see below). As a researcher once told one of the authors (Rose) : "I can't be held responsible for the policy implications of my work."
The 'Industry' Scientist They work directly for special interests, but expect their science (even when not peer-reviewed) to be accepted as objective. They either do not understand their conflicts of interest, or ignore them. As one government scientist emphatically stated in a policy meeting attended by one of the authors (Rose) , in response to a comment from a participant that there was disagreement over industry research results, "Only if you disagree with science!" (Parsons, 2013) and there are books that can also assist; we recommend Chapters 6e8 and 13 in Baron (2010) and Olson (2009) .
Scientists can get involved in policy inadvertently or deliberately, but regardless they should recognize (and investigate) when their research is likely to have policy implications. They should prepare for worst-case scenarios e for example, how their work could possibly be misinterpreted, or how the findings could be deliberately manipulated to promote a political agenda.
Scientists should also identify their goals in getting involved in policy when they are doing so deliberately. For example, are they seeking merely to provide objective information to policy-makers or are they seeking to influence a particular outcome? In our opinion, remaining completely objective is an unrealistic goal; nevertheless, many scientists think this is possible, reasonable, and even desirable. Scientists are human beings and should recognize that they have values and opinions (Noss, 2007) . Arguably staying uninvolved is not desirable and frequently not even possible, especially given that many conservation scientists received their training and conduct their research precisely because they value the conservation of biodiversity and wildlife.
Should marine scientists even engage in policy?
"The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing." Edmund Burke (Irish statesman and philosopher, 1729e1797)
"Those who have the privilege to know, have the duty to act." Albert Einstein (1879e1955) With all the pitfalls involved with scientists engaging in policy, should they simply avoid the policy arena? We would argue that, as marine scientists, we best understand the biology and ecology of marine species, ecosystems and ecological processes, as well as the uncertainty and caveats of research. Therefore, marine scientists should become involved, as our input is vital to the protection of the marine environment. The alternative is having those who do not understand marine science interpreting research results. This could lead to a 'Chinese whisper' effect, with each stage of translation of the translation of science to the policy-makers being oversimplified or distorted so that the policy-makers eventually receive incorrect information. Marine scientists engaging with policy helps research results arrive at a policy forum in a more accurate and less ideologically-transformed format.
In the field of conservation biology, arguably all research has policy implications. However, even in less applied fields of marine biology, research can have policy implications. Rose et al. (2011) analyzed a broad selection of published cetacean science literature (n ¼ 2812 papers) for the period 2005e2008. Of the papers that focused on some aspect of cetacean biology or ecology, approximately 54% were on basic biology, while the rest were on conservation-related topics. Given the necessarily somewhat subjective nature of determining whether a paper was focused on basic or applied biology, this was likely an underestimate of the number of studies undertaken to inform cetacean management or conservation actions. This suggests that, given the often cryptic ecology and conservation status of many marine mammals, if one is working with these taxa, then there are likely to be policy implications to one's work, and similar situations are likely for other marine species, top predators and/or biologically important habitats, such as rainforests.
Lost in translation
There are 435 members in the U.S. House of Representatives and 100 in the Senate. Currently, 25 Congressional members have some type of medical degree, while six are engineers and three are scientists (one microbiologist and two physicists), for a total of 34 members with a background in a STEM discipline. Therefore less than 10% of federal legislators have a background in science or science training at the college or university level and thus can be said to have a substantive understanding of science.
As an example, Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), a member of the House Committee on Science, Space and Technology, showed an illuminating (lack of) understanding of climate science by stating in a hearing on UN climate policies, "Is there some thought being given to subsidizing the clearing of rainforests in order for some countries to eliminate that production of greenhouse gases?" (Samuelsohn, 2011 ). Additionally, a low level of science literacy among policy-makers is not unique to the United States (e.g., Goldstein, 2010) . Therefore, expecting policy-makers to understand complex scientific methods, results and principles is unrealistic, although staffers often have the necessary background to understand these details.
Communications training can aid delivering a scientific message to policy-makers, and also to the general public (Olson, 2009 ). However, simply because a message is clear does not mean it will be absorbed, especially when dealing with issues that are so politically charged that policy-makers and journalists may filter these messages and 'cherry pick' statements that back their preconceived arguments (Wright et al., 2013a) . Still, clarity of message is often the exception rather than the rule.
The following example shows how one set of research results was misunderstood by the media in two directly conflicting ways. One should work to correct misinterpretation of one's findings whenever it occurs. Ideally, where appropriate, one should actively promote a specific conservation goal (e.g., protection of habitat, passage of legislation or regulations that benefit wildlife), which is difficult to misunderstand.
Do scientists have a responsibility to correct inaccurate interpretations of their work?
What should happen if policy-makers and the media misunderstand or misrepresent research results (accidentally or deliberately)? Some scientists say it is not their responsibility to correct the misinterpretations of others, but if these misunderstandings lead to policy decisions and public opinions that are deleterious to conservation, then we and other scientists (for example, see also Karr, 2006) disagree. Some scientific societies specifically direct their members to correct misrepresentations of their work. For example, the Society for Conservation Biology Code of Ethics calls for members to "attempt to correct misrepresentation of their research by others" (http://www.conbio.org/SCB/Information/Ethics/).
Unfortunately, there are many examples where researchers make no effort to correct the misuse of their results by politicians, industry, non-governmental organizations, or others (alternatively, when they do, there are times when they are ignored). Scientists are often passive, not wanting to get involved in controversies. This is an understandable human impulse, but in the case of science in policy, it is troubling.
Conflicts of interest
Researchers should accept and anticipate that conflicts of interest will occur on occasion, and that perceived conflicts of interest will occur even more often, rather than ignore, deny or reject the possibility. Rejecting potential conflicts will frequently merely emphasize the perception that one exists and consequently that one's data are biased.
Again, the Society for Conservation Biology calls for members to "disclose conflicts of interest." Moreover, the (U.S.) National Research Council describes the problem adeptly:
"… sponsors of research need to be aware that studies funded and led by one special interest are vulnerable to concerns about conflict of interest. For example, research on the effects of smoking funded by [the U.S. National Institutes of Health] is likely to be perceived to be more objective than research conducted by the tobacco industry" (National Research Council, 2000, p. 84 ).
These conflict of interest perceptions might appear as common sense when the issue is not related to one's own work, but when it is, it may be difficult not to take the perception personally. This impulse should be resisted. With tobacco, we can say, "of course, this is common sense." It is also common sense when the issue is military sonar, the welfare of captive marine mammals, whaling or marine oil and gas exploration impacts. Science coming from a user group (e.g., industry, military) e or heavily funded by a user group e is going to be perceived as biased. It is not a personal attack when this is pointed out.
Unfortunately when it comes to perceptions of conflicts of interest, there is often little that can be done to remedy these beyond being honest and open to audiences, clearly disclosing the conflict, and experiencing a subsequent series of positive, objective interaction with audiences. Scientists need to accept that some audiences will perceive a bias, and there is usually no way to eliminate initial public perceptions. Therefore, as noted above, scientists should not take this as a personal slight on their honor and integrity, but accept that perceptions of bias will happen and take this in their stride.
The fallacy of the truly independent scientist
Many research funding sources have political strings attached. For example, the U.S. Navy funds 70% of all marine mammal research in the United States and 50% of marine mammal research worldwide (Weilgart et al., 2004) . Its funding is allocated according to its policy priorities; likewise with major commercial funders (e.g., the oil and gas industry). Although non-profit charity funding is comparatively tiny, it too is used to advance an organization's agenda, which is ideological and often political.
Even in the best case, research foundations have priorities set by establishers and directors. These are often based on non-scientific values and opinions. With so much funding being politically motivated, it is difficult to identify scientists who are truly independent of political agendas. In addition to potential conflicts of interest, the fact that so much funding is politically motivated means that ideas that do not directly address political goals cannot be readily investigated.
However, conflicts may be even more egregious, through direct interference in research. There is evidence that the U.S. Navy has used the threat of withdrawing funding to stifle commentary from academics (Whitehead and Weilgart, 1995; Weilgart et al., 2004) . 1 Indeed, military representatives called the president and several deans of the academic institution of one of the authors (Parsons) , noting the concerns he had expressed regarding the impacts of military sonar on cetaceans in peer-reviewed papers, and further noting that the Office of Naval Research funded several research projects at this institution, in what was perceived as a not-terriblyveiled threat. Military officials also dictated which faculty could or could not be on the graduate committees of students who were actively serving in the military (Parsons, pers. obs.) .
In the environmental consulting field this has long been recognized e the client often dictates the conclusions of a study, because if a client is not pleased, contracts and funding are not renewed (see Wright et al., 2013b) . If one feels that speaking out might affect funding, or might otherwise result in punishment, then one does not have academic freedom and one's scientific opinion is not truly independent.
The Precautionary Principle
The Precautionary Principle was introduced as part of the 1982 United Nations World Charter for Nature, and was incorporated into the 1992 Rio Declaration (on Environment and Development), the result of the so-called Earth Summit meeting. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration described the Precautionary Principle as follows:
"Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation."
The European Union enshrines the Precautionary Principle in environmental decision-making (European Union, 2000):
"The precautionary principle applies where scientific evidence is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and preliminary scientific evaluation indicates that there are reasonable grounds for concern." It is a tenet of the Precautionary Principle that interventions (actions) are required to be put in place before actual harm occurs to humans or the environment, and managers cannot simply wait until there is scientific certainty or impacts occur (UNESCO, 2005) . However, in general a degree of initial scientific analysis is required before the Precautionary Principle is invoked, and that there is a "plausible" scientifically valid concern (UNESCO, 2005) . A good example of how the Precautionary Principle can be used is in the IPCC (2007) report, where scientifically plausible predictions are outlined on which policy-makers can base decisions.
However, it is an inside joke that a scientist's final comment in a presentation will be that more research/funding is needed. This is often a researcher's default response about the impacts of an environmental threat. Marine scientists are generally averse to taking a precautionary approach; as an example of nonprecautionary thinking, one researcher noted, "… [I]n five years, researchers will know enough about beaked whale behavior in response to sonar to allow the Navy to plan missions that have minimum impact on whales" (Madin, 2009) .
This comment focuses too much on science and not enough on policy e it ignores the Precautionary Principle. Policy inertia, which can lead to status quo conservation disasters that the Precautionary Principle was formulated to avoid, can sometimes arise from scientists' natural caution in interpreting results.
Marine scientists carry a lot of weight in the policy arena, even when they are not directly involved. Even a casual comment that becomes public can have undue influence on policy-makers. It is also important to note that comments can be taken out of context and then perpetuated, with the important caveats, exemptions and critical explanations that should accompany these comments being lost (Wright et al., 2013a) .
In policy development, disagreement can be good
Disagreement can sometimes lead to better policy in the long run and does not have to be perceived as conflict. Disagreeing on practical, real-time, cost-effective, and for that matter politically viable application of research results to management is not the same as disagreeing on (or ignoring) the results themselves. For example, we and our colleagues published a paper that, among other things, expressed concern about an over-reliance by policymakers on preliminary captive cetacean research results whose applicability to wild animals was uncertain, and the captive animal studies might be underestimating potential impacts on animals in their natural environment (Parsons et al., 2008) . Our original commentary was not a rejection of those results, but the researchers responsible for them perceived it as such (Ridgway and Houser, 2009; Wright et al., 2009) . Interestingly, the defensive marine scientists agreed with our assessment several years later (Houser et al., 2013) .
Far from impeding research, public pressure on policy-makers and funding agencies often results in greater funding for research (J. Reynolds, pers. comm.). Similarly, legal action to strengthen environmental policy often indirectly increases funding for research generally, by motivating user groups and agencies to meet the standards of relevant environmental laws (Reynolds et al., 2009 ). Marine scientists play an important e arguably essential e role in providing scientific advice to policy-makers. However, sometimes regulatory decisions are only tenuously based on science. This is not necessarily because science is being ignored or given low priority, but rather because it is often a step (or more) behind management needs. To avoid detrimental impacts to the environment, scientists should use a precautionary approach more frequently. Waiting until overwhelming data are available before suggesting conservation actions is ill-advised, as the wheels of policy and regulatory change can move slowly and historically conservation interventions have often been too late. Marine scientists giving their expert opinion can result in excellent sciencebased interim advice. If, for example, science eventually shows that a protected area is larger than required, it is easier to reduce the size of the area than it is to reintroduce the species populations that are extirpated because the area was too small. In addition, scientists engaging in the policy arena should take measures to:
Understand policy and how policy-makers can misunderstand science; Present science with policy implications carefully; Anticipate where and how science might be misunderstood, misinterpreted or taken out of context by policy-makers.
We recommend that more training in science communication, at both the undergraduate and graduate level, be made available at universities. This would include training in engaging with policymakers, addressing the media, and speaking to the lay public (Olson, 2009; Parsons, 2012) . Training should not only include communication techniques, but it should also prepare scientists for the pitfalls and obstacles that might be encountered when scientists engage in policy (Parsons, 2013) . We urge our colleagues to understand that even when science produces compelling results, politicians will make political decisions, and be prepared for this eventuality.
We also recommend that universities and academic bodies consider introducing additional metrics to their evaluations of conservation faculty and researcher success, including whether research published in journals is used in policy-making or environmental intervention. In other words, ask not only "Is a faculty member's research published?" but "Is it cited in regulatory contexts?" For example, are papers cited in environmental impact studies, documents justifying endangered species listing, or protected area establishment? Such a "real world" impact could become part of the faculty evaluation process. With universities showing an increasing interest in the media impact of research e via systems such as Altmetrics (www.altmetric.com) e it would be a simple step to develop metrics that measure conservation impacts.
It would be a very different, and better, world indeed if faculty gained tenure not for the size of their grants or how many papers they publish, but for the conservation and societal impact of their research beyond the ivory tower, with scientists being rewarded, instead of criticized, for producing marine science that matters.
